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At an NSC meeting in June 1954, Secretary of State Dulles expressed concern that the administration’s “tough policy was becoming increasingly unpopular.”  Particularly in Europe, he worried that “the distrust of US strategy among our allies” was “whittling down the influence of the United States.”  The conclusion he drew was that Washington would have to recognize that “we can no longer run the free world.”​[2]​
As some have noted and the introductory quote underscores, the US sense of “hegemonic dominance” during the Cold War was not as strong as often portrayed.​[3]​  In fact, what was more telling was the manner in which the foreign policy was conducted. 
The purpose of this paper is to trace US policy towards the EDC and to draw some lessons that may be applicable in the present transatlantic context.  The paper will be divided into two parts.   The first part reviews the evolution and implementation of US policy towards the EDC, with a focus on the beliefs and discourse of policy entrepreneurs, as well as the influence of domestic politics.  The second section posits four lessons that are important for current transatlantic relations.   

We Won: Now What?
The first decade after World War II reflected a critical transitional period, as the international system witnessed a remarkable transformation.  There was the creation of various international institutions – the UN, IMF and World Bank, the Council of Europe, the OECD, and eventually, NATO in 1949.  On the European continent, events leading to what became known as the Cold War – unrecognized at the time – occurred.  The breakdown of Four Power relations leading to the division of Germany into the Federal Republic in the West and the Democratic Republic in the East in 1949 also occurred.  The Berlin airlift and the Soviet testing of an atomic weapon confirmed the shift toward bipolar confrontation.  The economic struggle in Western Europe, as well as the threat of communist takeovers in France and Italy, also were important variables, in the sense that their flirtation with communism left officials in Washington nervous.​[4]​
	During the war, the United States had developed a vast global network of bases and basing relationships connected with defense.  While American officials accepted that the current network could not be sustained indefinitely at current levels because of pressures for returning to a peacetime stance, “a complete return to the status quo ante of 1940 also seemed unlikely in view of America’s now virtually unavoidable role as global power and guarantor of the peace.”​[5]​  
	By 1945, the United States possessed or used 434 bases of different size: 228 were in the Atlantic area, including 63 in the UK, France, and Germany.​[6]​  What to do with these bases and to what extent should the United States maintain a global presence became part of a larger debate over America’s role in the world.  There was a split between “hawks” and “doves.”  However, it would be misleading to describe the divide as between internationalists and isolationists.  Rather, the debate pitted those that advocated keeping a global international presence diplomatically on the one hand, and those who pushed for an aggressive forward-based defense strategy.  Those promoting the latter often referred to the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and easy captures of America’s weak Pacific perimeter defense to buttress their case.
	Others, more sensitive to the impact such a move might have on the Soviet Union, believed nuclear technology and strategic air power would suffice in defending the United States without provoking the Soviets into an unnecessary arms race.​[7]​    While the political debate continued, the Joint Staff quietly conducted numerous plans and reports over how best to adapt US military forces to the new postwar environment.​[8]​  What is striking about these JCS military plans and requirements is the continued emphasis on hemispheric defense, as well as the anticipated use of air and naval bases on islands in the Pacific and off North Africa and the Middle East.  Very little attention is devoted to the European continent.  As Harkavy observes:

A large land army presence on the European continent was not anticipated nor was…the magnitude of the accompanying large-scale presence of forward air and naval bases.  It appears that US planners either underestimated the forthcoming Soviet threat, or, somehow assumed that forward defense in Europe could be handled by Britain and France.​[9]​


The twin goals of maintaining economic prosperity and security at home while promoting stability and peace in the world would serve as the underpinnings for US policy toward Europe.   There were two schools of thought toward how to bring this about.  One school, led by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary of State Hull, advocated gutting or emasculating the war-making potential of Germany by de-industrializing the Ruhr and Saar regions.  A second school, supported by John Foster Dulles and George Kennan, believed that integrating Germany into a “federalized” Europe would be the best option.   According to this school, the Europeans needed to rationalize their state system, which had developed based on the concept of nationalism.  It was the division of Europe and balance of power politics, in John Foster Dulles’ view, which had led to the disastrous wars of the first half of the twentieth century, and Europeans had “an obligation to tie themselves together” to eliminate such nationalist tendencies.​[10]​
Dulles, for example, considered the “punishment economics” advocated by Morganthau and Hull as a recipe for fostering long-term resentment in Germany.  At the very least it would almost certainly create a negative backlash and be counterproductive for the United States and Western Europe. ​[11]​
	Certainly, there were concerns of a “Fortress Europe,” even as far back as 1942.  According to one State Department study, the danger existed that, if the Europeans developed their own sense of “European nationhood,” they might consider using “the economic weapon as a means of furthering continental policy” to the detriment of US interests.​[12]​  Secretary of State Hull worried that, if a European union developed, “such a union might lead to the formation of other economic power blocs and undermine prospects for a liberal trade policy and the formation of an international organization after the war.”​[13]​
	In the end, the question revolved around how best to prevent a resurgence of European economic nationalism (the high tariffs and rampant competitive protectionism), open the door for American goods, channel European economic potential positively, while at the same time encouraging Europeans to develop their militaries strong enough to defend against the Soviets but not in a way that would threaten intra-European actors, such as France.  A long-term consideration at the same time was: how to build up Europe into an organized union of sorts without it becoming dominated by a single European hegemon, or eventually turning against the United States in the global order?
	An examination of State Department records reveals the gradual shift from supporting European political and/or economic “unification” in 1943 to the more guarded and ambiguous wording in early 1944 of “closer economic and political collaboration” in Europe.​[14]​  One possible reason for this shift might be that President Roosevelt did not want the creation of a European federation to alienate the Soviets, whom he regarded as a partner in the post-war peace process.   As Cook writes, “While maneuvering and compromising at Yalta to build his peacekeeping machinery, Roosevelt displayed an almost total indifference to problems of postwar Western security in Europe.”​[15]​  His main concern was to keep an eye on the latent forces of isolationism.  Roosevelt even went so far as to tell Stalin and Churchill that he doubted whether he could keep American troops in Europe “for more than two years or so.”​[16]​
	At first, the Truman Administration sought to continue working with the Russians in trying to reach a pan-European settlement.  The concept of defending Europe militarily had not gelled.  The emphasis was on avoiding economic and political instability.  There was an explicit need to revive the sluggish European economy.  Even though the influence on American foreign policy at that time remained that of the late President Roosevelt, during the winter of 1946-47, it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union’s negative actions limited the chances of pan-European approaches. 
	By spring 1947, the realization began to dawn that the emphasis should switch from seeking German unification (fear that it would fall under Soviet domination) to promoting European integration, even if it focused only on the western part.  This way, Germany’s industrial strength would be channeled peacefully and contribute to the economic prosperity of its neighbors while also limiting the risk of a return of a new Reich seeking military conquest of the Continent.  It would also put the United States in a better position to deal with the Soviets.  Planners in Washington at that time still did not envision a direct Soviet attack.  The scenario that concerned them was one of “European economic disintegration, social demoralization, and political upheaval.”​[17]​
	Following various recommendations from Kennan and Undersecretaries Acheson and Clayton, in June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall delivered his famous Harvard speech announcing what has become known as the “Marshall Plan.”  Marshall’s speech emphasized the Europeans working together amongst themselves (but with American financial support and advice) to develop greater political and economic cohesion.  There was no mention urging the Europeans to increase their own defense or military cooperation.
	By 1948, many in Washington circles noted the continued hardening of Soviet positions toward the West.  In February, Moscow orchestrated a coup in Prague, raising alarm bells across Europe and the Atlantic of possible takeovers in Norway and Italy.  While those in Europe feared the prelude to a Soviet attack, most Washington policymakers continued to believe the threat to be more political than military.  Nevertheless, European threat perceptions fostered anxiety, and such fears could not be overlooked.  To help alleviate European fears, the State Department proposed an explicit commitment to defend Western Europe – but with caveats.  John Hickerson, chief of the State Department’s Office of European Affairs, sought to assuage Congress that such a commitment would not include additional American troops on the Continent.  Instead, “Europeans would provide the manpower themselves.”​[18]​  Thus, what the US was promising with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 was the psychological reassurance the Europeans needed that American military might would be there if needed.  
	Kennan and others now worried that, with a treaty signing and legal commitment, the United States had formally conceded the division of Europe and had abandoned any hopes of fostering unity on the Continent.  Kennan believed that the US had cut off any chance to pursue “a real federal structure in Europe which would aim to embrace all free European countries, which would be a political force in its own right.”  Instead of making Europe self-sufficient, allowing the United States to gradually withdraw from the responsibility of defending Europe, Kennan now saw the US forced into the “legal perpetuation of that responsibility.”  According to Kennan, “In the long-run, such a legalistic structure must crack up on the rocks of reality; for a divided Europe is not permanently viable, and the political will of the US people is not sufficient to enable us to support western Europe indefinitely as a military appendage.”​[19]​
	There were certainly influences in the State Department promoting European unity, even to the point of making it an independent (or at least, semi-independent) power center.  Hickerson had argued for the establishment of “a third force which was not merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to say ‘no’ both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions should so require.”​[20]​ 
Encouraging European defense autonomy also was supposed to allow the Europeans to graduate from dependence on American military and economic assistance.  In the words of one historian:

Effective integration would enable the Europeans to stand on their own feet and allow the United States to reduce the scale of its aid to Europe, begun with the Marshall Plan and continued through military assistance to the NATO powers.  There was a danger, of course, that a United Europe might, over time, prove to be a rival to America, but Washington tended to see the perpetuation of European dependency as a greater long-term problem.   Partnership, not American dominion, was the objective.​[21]​  

	Some scholars suggest that the US response was a dual-Containment one toward the existing threat from the Soviet Union and a potential one from a fully independent and rearmed Germany. ​[22]​   While this may be true, the response was more nuanced than that.  The manifestation of such containment was different.  The United States sought to contain the Soviets through blocking and counter-blocking moves and isolation.  With Germany, though, the Americans sought to contain through integration.  In other words, the US employed a containment-by-isolation strategy with the Soviets and containment-by-engagement strategy with the Germans.
	In the American view, if the Germans gained full independence, there was a fear that Germany would be vulnerable to irredentism.   But, as some would argue, the greater fear was that Germany might either side with the Soviet Union or try to play the East off the West, thus aggrandizing itself while sapping Western efforts to confront the Soviets.​[23]​  In a conversation with Churchill in June 1954 before the fate of the EDC had been decided, Eisenhower told the British leader that “we could not afford to lose Germany even though we were to lose France.”​[24]​  The essential question was how to leverage German resources and strength without them posing a threat to the Alliance or Germany’s neighbors?
	Convincing the Europeans to rearm for their own defense was another issue.  As Ambrose aptly describes, “To the Europeans, NATO meant a guarantee that the United States would not desert them, that they could count on the atomic bomb to deter the Red Army.  They could see little reason to rearm themselves.  Rearmament would merely provoke the Russians, they reasoned, without creating sufficient strength to repel them - at least without using atomic bombs - and if they were going to use atomic bombs, why rearm?”​[25]​  The danger at the time was not of an immediate nuclear holocaust, but that the building up of conventional forces in Western Europe might tempt the Soviets into launching a pre-emptive war against the West.  With 175 armed divisions, this would be a war the Soviets would not lose on the ground.  NATO had only twelve divisions.  Eisenhower argued that the Alliance could defend Western Europe with forty (later the number would be boosted to 96), only six of which needed to come from the United States.​[26]​

Crisis in Asia: Dilemma in Europe
The situation reached a crescendo in 1950, ironically, on the other side of the world from Europe – on the Korean peninsula.  Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the United States and its European allies feared that this might be the opening gambit of a global Soviet strategy to distract the US and conquer the European continent.  It was imperative to buttress the weak military forces in Europe, which were still recovering from the end of World War II.
	At the end of June 1950, the US had 122,158 military forces in Europe.​[27]​  Just two years earlier, in 1948, there had been about 140,000 American troops.​[28]​  The major concern in Western Europe following the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea was over command and control of NATO forces.  Up to that time, NATO’s orientation had been toward planning, not commanding.  There was no unified way to conduct a Western defense given multiple armed forces under diverse command arrangements.  As Field Marshall Montgomery warned, “As things stand today, and in any foreseeable future, there would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in Western Europe if we were ever attacked by the Russians.”​[29]​
	Field Marshall Montgomery was not the only one to recognize the need for more integrated defense.   A number of leaders in Europe also wanted NATO to have a more permanent structure, but the US resisted, hoping to avoid further involvement in the defense of Europe.  In early June 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff – aware of growing European pressure for a NATO command – admitted that “we can no longer completely avoid approaching the question of a command organization under the North Atlantic Treaty.”​[30]​  The Korean War changed the US administration’s reluctance almost overnight.
Given the initial hesitancy of the US role in developing an integrated command within NATO, the enthusiasm the Americans displayed toward its implementation may seem odd.  According to Pedlow:

Once the US position had swung over to strong advocacy, the United States seemed overly conscious of its new, postwar strength and at times showed little tolerance for the sensitivities of the other NATO members, as was clearly demonstrated in the handling of the SACLANT appointment and in the complicated naval command relationships that had to be developed in the Mediterranean because the United States was not willing to place the Sixth Fleet under a NATO command that was not headed by an American.  This stand was strongly influenced by American insistence on maintaining a direct chain of command over forces equipped with atomic weapons, but a belief that the United States’ military strength entitled it to fill the key command positions also played a role.​[31]​


	However, to suggest that the United States promoted the increase of American military troops to reinforce its hegemony over Western Europe is to misread the elements of the debate.  Not all wanted to commit to such a step, even after the Korean War highlighted the Communist threat.  Others were equally or more concerned over the burden that such a move would have on the United States, both in terms of domestic freedom and economic prosperity.  According to Williams:

Taft was firm in his belief…that the United States should not assume the leadership in the “formation of a great international army” or appoint an American Commander in Chief as this would only encourage European pressures on Washington to enlarge its presence.  Commitments, he felt, could develop a life of their own - and it was essential to prevent this happening.​[32]​


Taft’s view though was not purely isolationist.  His concern focused primarily on the trade-off between short-term exigencies and long-term principles.  For Taft, it was essential to set strict limits on the parameters of a US troop deployment to Europe.  Without such “safeguards,” Taft believed that the American commitment could quite easily escalate, resulting in an American military presence “more enduring and substantial than was either desirable or necessary.”​[33]​  As one can see, while no one disputed the Soviet threat, what was disputed was how to respond.  
Moreover, Taft’s national interests differed from those of Truman and Acheson, reflecting different philosophical views of foreign affairs. More than most Republicans, Taft had a definitive alternative to the Truman/Acheson foreign policy.  His position was that the priority for American foreign policy should be its internal effect on America rather than the external impact on other nations.  As Williams describes: 

Taft’s starting point for thinking about foreign policy was not the kind of world he would like to see, but the kind of America he wanted.  The Truman Administration, in contrast, began from the premise that the freedom of the United States was inseparable from that of its European allies, that security was indivisible for the members of the Atlantic Pact, and that the obligations and responsibilities shouldered by the United States from 1947 onwards had to be fulfilled regardless of how costly and burdensome this proved.​[34]​


	Taft was not unaware of the Communist threat.  In fact, he considered the threat to be of a long-term nature.  Thus, he feared that the surge in cost to support Western Europe would be too high price that in the end would drain American resources and reduce liberty by promoting big government and a large armed forces.​[35]​  Again, compared to traditional isolationists, Taft would refrain from that association.  Rather, he argued that the United States should be a “good citizen” of the world, no more, no less.  He was one of the first to warn against the dangers of overstretch and even the possible development of a “national security state” or what Eisenhower later referred to as the “military-industrial complex.”  The strategy proposed by Taft was this: 

Priority was to be given to the defense and protection of America, the “Citadel” of the free world.  This entailed an American attempt to obtain control of both sea and air.  Taft was a strong advocate, therefore, of an expanded air force and argued that the strategic capabilities of the United States had been allowed to deteriorate as a result of the Administration’s short-sightedness….​[36]​  


Taft believed that building up the air force would prove a greater deterrent and more successful than a ground force build-up, which might actually have a counter-productive effect, even to the point of possibly provoking the Soviets to conduct a pre-emptive war before Western forces were prepared.
	Nevertheless, Taft recognized that the Administration’s announcement of sending more US troops to Europe had to be honored, since the Allies’ expectations had been raised.  Since it was too late to withdraw the offer, the next best step would be to tone down and limit the numbers, with more a token show of support in “the spirit of the Atlantic Pact” than actual major substantive increases.​[37]​  
	In the end, by raising numerous questions over the role and limits of the Executive branch to deploy troops overseas, as well as the terms of the American security commitment to the defense of Europe, Taft introduced into the discourse many of the issues (most notably, the burden-sharing debate) that continue to this day.  It was in the context of debate over how high a price should the United States be willing to pay for its security and the role that Western Europe played in that security policy that the idea of the Europeans establishing their own defense force evolved.  It became a suitable political response, even if not an optimal military one.  Several prominent Republican congressmen were in the lead in suggesting that the Europeans should be pressured into providing more of their own defense, especially in terms of ground forces.  After all, the United States, according to these Republicans, was already providing the overwhelming bulk of naval and air forces in the defense of Europe.  Other, more internationalist Republicans, such as Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, felt that it should not be an either/or proposition.  Consequently, various formulas and ratios were argued, but what came out was that there should be a link between an American military contribution and the European one.  How the Europeans would do more was left open.

Germany: Problem and Solution? 
	This raised a big question in the minds of many: what to do about Germany?  Resolving the “German question” was key to organizing a credible defense against a conventional Soviet threat.  Only Germany had the requisite troop numbers to add real teeth to the forces on the ground.  However, valid fears about German irredentism (above all in France) required a delicate handling of the situation.  So, the question was: how best to integrate Germany into the West without provoking potential negative responses in communist-laden countries such as France and Italy?  The psychological considerations had to be addressed.  Surveys revealed that, in some quarters, French respondents were more fearful of Germany than they were of the Soviet Union.  After all, the Germans had ravaged France three times within the living memory of some French.  Such trauma is not easily forgotten – or forgiven.
	A solution was found in NATO.  In September 1950, at the Foreign Ministers meeting in New York, Secretary of State Acheson announced a revamping of NATO to include both an integrated military command and the introduction of German divisions within a unified NATO structure, subordinate to an American Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR).  
	The proposal represented the optimal short-term solution to the “German problem” and most efficient from a military perspective.  Even the French military agreed that the NATO solution was best.  The nuclear guarantee was not nearly as established as many would believe, especially around 1950.​[38]​  The advantage of the NATO plan was it would account for the French fear because the German contribution would be subsumed under a NATO integrated command, under the leadership of the American SACEUR.  Unlike the EDC, the NATO plan would include the US and UK, which would ensure that Germany would not be in a position to threaten France.
	However, France was the only ally that did not approve the NATO solution at the time. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, who were trying to implement the Schuman Plan creating a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), worried that Acheson’s NATO proposal might jeopardize their European project.  If Germany regained its full sovereignty – including rearmament – then German enthusiasm for ECSC might wane.  Faced in September 1950 by the united Anglo-American front, Schuman insisted that the proposal needed to be vetted by the French Cabinet and brought before the entire Assembly as well.
	The resulting debate created a clash between logic and emotion.  For the Americans, the argument was straightforward: the Pentagon had calculated that NATO needed an additional twelve divisions (Congress had already agreed to the presence of four US divisions) to defend against a potential Soviet attack in central Europe.  Because of overseas obligations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the French physically did not have the forces to fulfill that requirement.  Thus, the American perspective was that the US should be allowed to look to Germany.​[39]​
	The French also had a logical response, though it was a cover for the emotional trauma stemming from three German onslaughts in just over a generation.  The French response was as follows: Of course, German troops could be used to defend against a Soviet invasion, but the Americans were proposing the impossible – “a one-way army, a German legion built to march only East, never West.”​[40]​  This would be historically unprecedented, and there was no guarantee that Germany could or would remain a pliant tool of Western policy.  The French reminded Americans that Germany’s rise to power came from its ability to toggle back and forth between Russia and Western Europe.  The fear was that Germany, after a few years, might outgrow the bounds imposed by the US and invade East Germany to try to unite Germany by force, sparking the very war with Russia that the West so fervently sought to avoid.​[41]​  Therefore, the perfect French response to a question that could not be answered by either a “yes” or a “no” was “Europe.”​[42]​  The French responded, one month later in October 1950, with the Pleven Plan: what would become the European Defense Community.
	The Pleven Plan attempted to solve two separate problems of Germany at once by infusing them into one grand bargain solution.  The first was political, and the second was military.  Whereas the Americans treated them as distinct issues, the French managed to integrate them into the EDC concept.  The Pleven Plan was named after René Pleven, who had made his name originally as a Gaullist.  Ironically, the proposed ESDP fifty years later would also spring from Gaullist heritage.  However, the strongest resistance to the EDC had come from the communists on the left and the Gaullists on the right.
The American government’s initial reaction was considerable skepticism toward the project.​[43]​  After all, NATO had just been formed only a few years earlier in 1949 and, while there was a certain logic to the integration of European coal and steel sectors, the same logic was questioned when applied to European military integration.  American political officials in particular questioned the efficiency and nature of establishing a European army that would be answerable to a common assembly.  As one commentator noted, “By the time Jules Moch, the Defense Minister of France, had finished explaining the Pleven Plan to the NATO Council it was evident that Washington’s second thoughts more accurately mirrored American official policy.”​[44]​ 
	According to Secretary of State Acheson, both he and President Truman reacted with “consternation and dismay” to the proposal.  They concluded that the Pleven Plan was “hastily conceived without serious military advice and…unrealistic and undesirable.”​[45]​  As Walton describes:

Washington blew hot and cold. Secretary of State Acheson first welcomed the Pleven Plan as a means of lessening differences between the United States and France but on second thought recognized that acceptance of the French proposal meant an indefinite postponement in building the effective fighting force that America felt was necessary.​[46]​

	Not just political officials were doubtful.  US military planners also were skeptical of the practical defense implications of a European army where German units were integrated below the division level.  General Eisenhower initially hated the project, believing that it would actually produce disharmony and friction rather than unity, not to mention the plan being “militarily unsound and ineffective.” He suspected that the French had introduced the plan hoping it would be rejected and thus either delay or prevent German rearmament.​[47]​
	From the French perspective, the British position was key to getting the Americans on board.  If the French could persuade London to participate, they might have a better chance of “softening American opposition.”​[48]​  However, the initial British response under the Labor government was not promising.  In a speech on October 31, 1950, the British government pledged “full support toward building Europe’s defenses within the Brussels Pact and NATO.”​[49]​  There was no mention of a European army or the need for one per se.  In fact, a House of Commons report in November 1950 was even more explicit, stating that the government would be “unable to accept the proposals put forward for a European Army and a European Minister of Defense” because such fell under NATO’s purview.  The Pleven Plan would only result in “duplication, confusion and divided responsibility.”​[50]​
	For the British, there remained a lingering doubt about US staying power and commitment to Western Europe.  What was interesting was how British Foreign Minister Eden viewed the permanence of NATO compared to a possible EDC.  Eden, whose political life included the decade of the 1930’s American isolationism, worried that the US would get fed up with the Europeans and withdraw back to its shores.  The British Foreign Minister’s main concern was the “haunting possibility that [America] may slip back into a new form of isolationism…and try to ‘go it alone,’ or, alternatively, be tempted to ‘do a deal’ with the other great Power in the world.”​[51]​  Eden came to view the Atlantic Alliance as a “temporary” coalition and had no assurance that the Americans would remain committed to Europe’s defense.  Meanwhile, he considered a European army as a “permanent” force.​[52]​  
	Eden’s influence was revealed when Ernest Davies (the author of the earlier House of Commons report denouncing the European Army concept) announced that the “Government did not rule out altogether the possibility of a European Army being fitted into the pattern of the Atlantic defenses provided that there was no delay in building up Western defenses and no danger of weakening the security of the Atlantic Powers.”​[53]​
	Despite reservations, the United States agreed to allow the French to explore their proposal.  However, the Americans continued to pursue the NATO solution.  Thus, for about 18 months, there were two sets of discussions on how to rearm Germany: the Pleven Plan in Paris and the NATO plan at the Petersberger Hof in Germany.  As one observer notes, “[T]hese discussions went their separate ways, like a two-ring circus, with spectators bobbing their heads back and forth to find out what was going on.”​[54]​
	The discussions reflected different views of how to incorporate the German military potential.  In Paris, the French framed the desired outcome as one that essentially brought the Germans in almost as legionnaires, in small units of 3,000-4,000 and under an international flag.  Their potency as a massed force would be almost completely subsumed under the EDC rubric.  The French contribution, however, would remain unified as France’s army in Europe until the very last moment, thus allowing Paris to maintain its dominance both in force terms as well as its control of the EDC military staff, comprised mostly by French officers.​[55]​
	Meanwhile, the talks in the Petersberg were much more focused on speed and military capacity.  This was much more in line with German and US Army desires.  As White notes, “The United States Army wanted German troops, flesh and blood soldiers, quickly, not a long philosophical discussion about the creation of a new superstate.  Philosophers might talk at Paris, but soldiers talked at the Petersberger Hof.”​[56]​  Moreover, military specialists remained skeptical that a multilingual fighting force was possible.​[57]​
	The contrast was stark. Whereas in Paris, the Germans would provide forces in 3,000-4,000 person increments, in the Petersberg talks, Germany would contribute 250,000 troops, twelve heavily armored divisions, complete with its own General staff and War Minister.  The equipment would be provided by the United States, until the Germans could resume their own armaments production.​[58]​
	The composition of the EDC was forty standing divisions.  Of those, 14 would be French; 12 German; 11 Italian; and 3 from the Benelux countries.  Soldiers would be led by their own nationality up to the division level.  After that, the nationalities would be mixed.​[59]​
	Some observers noted the consequences of promoting a new institution, even if that were to be an internal institution within NATO.  The fact that the UK and the United States were excluded from the institution suggested the seeds of NATO’s own potential demise, since there was no guarantee that the continental Europeans would maintain similar interests as those in London or Washington. ​[60]​
	Radical revision of the Pleven Plan made the EDC more palatable to the Americans.  Taking advantage of the transition following the June 1951 French elections, the Americans persuaded the French to accept a shift in the Plan.  The German units would be the same size as the French, and they would all be brought under control of the supranational authority simultaneously.  With the encouragement of Monnet, Eisenhower, and Bruce, the Americans moved the plan forward and made it possible.  Eisenhower’s staff at SHAPE formed the military structures, while Bruce’s staff outlined the civilian and budget and political organization of the EDC.​[61]​
	Enthusiasm for the Pleven Plan waned as early as a year later, even in France.  The very reason that the Pleven Plan was considered the superior route was that it would “solve” the German problem by incorporating German forces (and thus diluting their power) into a larger European force.  Yet, even as early as December 1951, French Defense Minister Jules Moch worried that the EDC concept had merely become “a camouflage for a revived Wehrmacht.”​[62]​  Thus, even at that stage, there were continued doubts about the EDC’s ability to assuage French fears and fulfill American military goals.  Yet, the American position remained in favor of the Pleven Plan and EDC.
	In October 1951, the Conservatives regained power, which seemed to heighten French hopes that the British would join the EDC.  However, those hopes were soon crushed when, on November 28, 1951, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe told the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg that the UK would remain outside.  As Walton notes:

France and England seemed astonished at the other’s action and in a real sense both camps had a measure of reason on their side.  The Conservatives had never once intimated that they would actually join a supranational authority and resented what they felt was a misrepresentation of their position.  On the other hand, the French had never made any attempt to conceal their interpretation of the Churchill motion as a supranational project and felt incensed that Churchill, the Prime Minister, was unwilling to support Churchill, the parliamentarian.​[63]​


	Some of the questions that lingered in 1952 after the EDC Treaty had been signed (but not ratified) reflected fundamental concerns over the practical nature of a supranational armed force operating during crisis.  For example, would the decision-making structure, which required unanimity, prove to be too slow and bulky to be effective?  Would linguistic challenges create misunderstanding in the transmission of orders through the chain of command, with costly and catastrophic results?  Would the military formation of groupements, untested in war or peace, stand up to a potential invasion by seasoned Russian troops?  Would national troops be willing to cede homeland territory for tactical advantage?​[64]​  All of these questions remained unanswered as the United States considered its policy position toward the EDC.
	The debate continued in Washington over how to view the EDC proposal.  Ambassador to France David Bruce, an ardent Europhile and close confidant of Jean Monnet, favored it strongly, arguing that a European army would expedite the rearming of the Continent through European rather than national channels, thus fostering economies of scale and eliminating unnecessary duplication of limited resources.  Such an effort would meet US short-term needs and speed up the process of strengthening NATO by “reducing [the] number of its major elements to three: United States, Brit[ain], and Europe.”​[65]​
	After receiving instructions from Washington to force the French to accept the Petersberg Plan to integrate German units directly into NATO, Bruce wrote his own “long telegram” on July 3, 1951, where he responded to the EDC critics.  In it, Bruce outlined why the Pleven Plan (in addition to the Schuman Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community) actually would lead the French to accept German parity with France.  According to Bruce, the “French must recognize that German integration with European community through Schuman Plan and European Army must be their main safeguards.”  Bruce went on to argue that US leverage with the French would be lost if Washington rejected the Pleven Plan, thus causing a huge break in the relationship with France.  In Bruce’s words, “Such rift in Atlantic community would be most damaging and great opportunity would have been missed to create real situation of strength in Europe, perhaps for period far into future.”​[66]​  The cable from Bruce, along with an endorsement from SACEUR Eisenhower and backing from McCloy in Germany, seemed to work, because a month later, Acheson reversed his position. ​[67]​
	Once it was clear that France would not accept the NATO plan, others – including the US and UK turned their attention to the EDC, despite the obvious drawbacks.  Acheson concluded that the United States might be able to accept the EDC, but only if it “did not detract from NATO’s strength and did not delay Germany’s contribution to the defense forces of Western Europe….The European army and its command structure had to be strictly integrated within NATO.”​[68]​  In other words, there would be no autonomous European command.  The EDC would be a pillar within the Atlantic Alliance – but not separate from it.
Even after the agreement for EDC, it was an uphill battle for Americans promoting it.  According to Lankford: 

At a high-level NATO meeting, Bruce found himself “almost its sole upholder” when the subject of EDC came up within the American delegation.  He urged State to forget about alternatives and to pressure “participants to bring matter to conclusion as rapidly as possible.”  He called the NATO Council’s ratification of EDC “the most significant political action (outside of war) taken in Europe for centuries.”  He knew the critical point would come later when individual parliaments voted on the plan, and he anguished over what he called Washington’s insensitivity to French concerns and the Pentagon’s pro-German attitudes.​[69]​


	According to one biographer, “The decision to back the EDC happened because American Europeanists, mainly Bruce, Eisenhower, and McCloy, saw a vision of long-term benefit in the military as well as the economic integration of Europe.”​[70]​

Delay…delay…delay… 
	Following a bogged down, drawn out negotiating and ratification process (delayed most conspicuously in the French assembly), the future of the EDC languished as world events changed.  The Korean War ended in armistice, Stalin died, and no assault came in Europe from Russia.  The changing international circumstances had an impact on French and German views of EDC, most notably in terms of diminishing the sense of urgency for incorporating German troops into Western defense.  The French were growing weary of their military efforts in Southeast Asia and increasingly felt the weight of their overseas commitment in Africa.  Some in Paris also feared that, because of these overseas military obligations, the Germans might come to dominate the EDC over time.  Such a prospect worried many swing voters in the French Assembly.
	New governments existed in both Washington and London.  There was a marked contrast toward the EDC between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.  Chief of Staff Bradley had thought the EDC was impractical and militarily inoperable.  Acheson had allowed for grudging support, primarily based on the benefits to US-French relations.  Eisenhower, on the other hand, recognized the political and economic benefits of favoring the EDC. Even before becoming President, Eisenhower came to believe that European unification would solve many of the problems facing him, both in terms of alleviating the drain on American resources, promoting the security of Western Europe in the long-term, and facing up to the Soviet threat.  As he told Averell Harriman, “Every day brings new evidence that Western Europe must coalesce both politically and economically, or things will get worse instead of better.  It seems remarkable that all European political leaders recognize the truth of this statement but just sit down and do absolutely nothing about it.”​[71]​
Once he had decided, Eisenhower proceeded to tout the European army idea, from public speeches to Senate testimony.​[72]​  For example, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee in July 1951, Eisenhower argued:

I believe in it this much – when I came over here [to Europe] I disliked the whole idea of a European Army, and I had enough troubles without it.  However,…I made up my mind to go into the thing with both feet…and I realize that a lot of my professional associates are going to think I am crazy.  But I tell you that joining Europe together is the key to the whole question!​[73]​

	By the time Eisenhower found himself in the White House, domestic arguments for supporting the EDC added to his conviction.  Here was a chance for the Administration to scale back its resource commitments, develop geo-political flexibility, all at the marginal relative cost of power.​[74]​  In fact, the Eisenhower Administration took the original French-inspired Pleven Plan and turned it into an American one, becoming essentially more converted than the original creators themselves.​[75]​
	By the summer of 1953 – the critical run-up to the now famous rejection by the French assembly in 1954 – US agitation over the EDC situation was making European allies nervous.  There were rumors that the US was considering a redeployment of US forces in Europe.  Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was considered to be one of the leading figures to be “beating the tom-toms” on redeployment.​[76]​
	The other element was the reconsideration of the use of nuclear weapons to defend Europe.  Three factors influenced Eisenhower’s thinking in this regard.  First, he sought to reduce the high defense budget he inherited from the previous administration.  Second, he believed that, from a military standpoint, the US should rely less on quantity (hundreds of aircraft employing conventional munitions) and more on quality (i.e., tactical nuclear weapons).  Finally, it was important for Eisenhower to avoid making the impression that the United States planned a fixed and permanent presence in Europe.  He continued to stress that Europe should be primarily responsible for its own security.  From his perspective, it was not “possible – and most certainly not desirable – that Europe should be an occupied territory defended by legions brought in from abroad, somewhat in the fashion that Rome’s territory vainly sought security many hundreds of years ago.”​[77]​  Although redeployment of US forces in Europe was a long-term US government goal, Eisenhower wanted to keep it quiet lest such a move create anxiety among the European allies, reduce NATO cohesion, and kill the concept of the EDC (and thus force the Americans to remain on the Continent).​[78]​
	The latter half of 1953 proved a difficult time.  Secretary of State Dulles issued his famous “agonizing reappraisal” message in Paris in December 1953, a statement that reverberated throughout Europe.​[79]​  President Eisenhower was upset because it went contrary to a National Security Council meeting earlier that month, where it was agreed that only the President would speak publicly to US troop considerations.​[80]​  The first order was to ensure the establishment of the EDC.  Any hint of a change in US policy towards Europe would have the potential of “important psychological implications” in Europe.​[81]​  Therefore, was this a failure of diplomacy?  Or was it a calculated political risk, designed to exert leverage on a divided French assembly?  If it was a deliberate effort on Dulles’ part to sway the French, it seems to have backfired.  The initial response in France was to galvanize the anti-EDC lobby.
	The difference between selling the Schuman Plan and selling the Pleven Plan of EDC rested in persuading the French.  However, unlike the European Coal and Steel Community, the EDC concept was much more complex.  As one observer at the time noted, “It has become too complex in detail for ordinary people to understand its critical essence, and thus the politicians who support it have difficulty rallying popular support.”​[82]​  Moreover, while the institutional structures and logic of the ECSC and EDC were comparable, they led to different implications.   According to the same observer: 

The Schuman Plan could be explained to Frenchmen as an act of common sense, for one could bring the delinquent back to decency only by giving him a decent opportunity to earn a decent living.  But it was something else to give a delinquent Germany arms again so swiftly after she had so shockingly abused them.​[83]​   

	In the end, what it proved was the limit of executive influence by one government on the legislative assembly of another.  The United States had a goal of the EDC; yet, it failed to persuade the French assembly – the one legislature yet to have ratified – to confirm the project.  Thus, American government policy was blunted, and Washington – as well as the West – needed to find an alternative.  As the French government continued to delay the debate and vote on the EDC Treaty in the assembly, American and British frustration grew.  For example, in March 1954, after Prime Minister Laniel once more put off the EDC debate, Dulles was “deeply disturbed,” and the British foreign minister was “furious.”​[84]​  There was increasing concern that such delay would spillover into US congressional views toward troops and money in Europe, as well as fostering pressure on Germany and in the Alliance as a whole.
	The response to that frustration was to move as close as possible to reassure the French of US and British commitment to the defense of Western Europe.  Thus, virtually the entire defense of the West was held hostage to the whims of the French assembly.  For its part, London beefed up its commitment to associate with the EDC, including the promise to put a British division under an EDC commander.  Washington agreed to keep American troops in Europe, reinforcing its commitment to NATO and calling for a close relationship between NATO and the EDC.​[85]​  It seemed that the French held all the cards.  If France did not agree, there was greater fear that Germany would be lost to the Soviets (or neutralism), and Germany was the key for defending the West.
	Thus, with so much at stake, it seemed remarkable that the United States was unable to exert greater pressure on Paris to follow through.  It was as if the US could go only so far, just as Washington had failed to persuade London to take the lead in European integration a few years earlier.
	In the United States, the domestic constraints were considerable.  While the hardening of the US position toward France in the spring of 1954 reflected frustration from French vacillation on EDC over the previous two years, it also stemmed from the situation in Congress, specifically the approaching consideration of the Mutual Security Budget for Fiscal Year 1955.  What was at stake was the Richards Amendment, which specifically prohibited military assistance to those EDC countries that had not ratified the treaty (e.g., France), while giving full assistance to non-EDC NATO countries such as the UK.  State Department officials predicted that, if France did not ratify the EDC by the time hearings on the Budget began in April, “our ‘agonizing reappraisal’ will occur but in the most explosive place – the floor of the Congress.” ​[86]​  Thus, to add pressure to French ratification, as well as stave off Congressional action, the State Department recommended “shock treatment” for the French by having the administration support the Richards Amendment. ​[87]​

Asia – Again 
	Just as the situation with the EDC appeared to reach a climax in the spring of 1954, events in Asia once more provided a critical external factor into the equation.  This time it was Vietnam.  The French were seeking to withdraw honorably after the loss at Dien Bien Phu in May.  The Americans were not happy, interpreting the French administration’s preoccupation with Geneva peace negotiations yet again as another delaying tactic.   According to one historian: 

The Americans were frustrated by this latest source of delay and some in Washington thought the French might be “deliberately stalling” on the EDC in order to improve their negotiating hand at Geneva….But the French, concluding that their negotiating hand with the Soviets vis-à-vis Indochina would be stronger if they appeared to retain the power to veto German rearmament, seemed ready to risk arousing Washington’s displeasure.​[88]​


	The Americans were worried that if there was too much pressure on the Laniel government, his coalition might fall, and the consequent government might not be so pro-EDC as Laniel’s was.   The domino theory was not limited to the spread of communism in Indochina.  As Dulles warned, “We must be on our guard lest Indochina also carry [the] European Defense Community down the drain.”​[89]​
	It seemed that the issue of national identity was preoccupying France just as everyone else needed the French to sacrifice some of their sovereignty for the sake of the EDC.  The collapse of Vietnam and the pooling of forces for the EDC would be too much.  Dulles remarked, “France seems to be deteriorating as a great power and losing capacity to govern itself or to deal with its problems.”​[90]​   Reaction to France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu was “out of all proportion to its military importance.”  Its loss symbolized the shattered image of a country having totally lost all confidence in itself and a metaphor to the “collapse of French will, in relation both to Indochina and EDC.”​[91]​  The irony was that Paris seemed to be the pivotal player in those decisions affecting US national security strategy not just in Europe but also in Asia.  Washington was dependent on France, despite the prominence of American military and economic power.  American leverage seemed to be insufficient to move the French assembly.  For example, by the spring of 1954, the United States “was underwriting around 75 percent of the total financial cost of the French war effort” and did not want to squander that investment.​[92]​
	On July 13, 1954, as the pressure built on France to move on EDC, Dulles met with Mendès-France.  Dulles implied that if France did not support EDC – and soon – the United States might just do what Eden had feared and “write off what we have tried to do to build up the defensive strength of Western Europe as a noble but unproductive experiment.”  Dulles implied that he would recommend the US opt for a “peripheral form of defense involving the UK, Spain, Greece, Turkey and other peripheral countries,” as Congress and the Pentagon preferred.​[93]​  
	Mendès-France found himself in a corner.  In order to relieve domestic pressure and external pressure from the US, he tried to foist the eventual blame for any failure of EDC onto his European partners.  On August 19, 1954, all the EDC powers met in Brussels.  At that gathering, the French proposed major modifications, changes they knew the other powers would almost certainly reject. In essence, France was asking everyone to alter the very nature of the EDC in both form and content.
	The level of frustration in Washington continued to build.  According to Ruane:

Ultimately, what probably irritated the Eisenhower administration most was the new French Premier’s determination to put his country’s interests before those of the United States….In many ways, therefore, 1954 was the year that “France finally declared its independence of Washington,” with Mendès-France sowing the seeds that de Gaulle would later reap.​[94]​

	What probably made matters worse was that the United States had committed all its energies into the EDC, with no fallback position.  In other words, Eisenhower had no contingency plan to France and the EDC.  Churchill criticized the Americans for their “obstinate adherence” to EDC and “natural reluctance to countenance any competitive idea.”​[95]​
	In the end, the Americans had focused on the French, hoping they would take the lead on European defense.  However, with French vacillation in the 1950’s culminating with their ultimate rejection of the EDC, American confidence in French leadership was permanently lost.  A plan conceived in peace for an imminent war that never came, the EDC fell victim to French domestic politics too powerful for the United States to overcome.
	
What About Today?
	There are at least four lessons that can be drawn from the review of how the US approached the European Defense Community that are relevant for today’s transatlantic relations.

Lesson One: Threat perceptions differ from threat responses.  By 1953, all had agreed on the threat Soviet aggression posed.  However, there were degrees of difference on how best to respond to the threat, and for some, the Soviet Union itself was not the sole threat.  Consequently, uncertainty and friction developed between the US and European allies over how best to counter the threat.  The battle over ratification of the EDC is one such example.  For the US, it represented an opportunity to build on the previous efforts to force Franco-German reconciliation and promote European unity.  The US fervently tried to persuade the French to take the lead in European security affairs and became frustrated when Paris wavered.  The Americans were in the midst of a defense review, seeking to reposition their forces out of Europe, primarily to save money.  
For France, the EDC was more than just to counter the Soviet threat.  It also represented an abdication of sovereignty and another step in the decline from empire.  The French also feared the re-emergence of German military might.  Thus, the conflation of these interests (Soviet threat, German threat, and sovereignty threat) meant that the French were unwilling to respond in a way that the Americans desired.  Since the Americans pushed only one option – the EDC – there was no flexibility on alternative means for countering the threat.
	Similarly, there is general consensus regarding the dangers posed by transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed or fragile states.  There needs to be more thorough discussions on how best to respond to those threats. 

Lesson Two: Understanding one another is vital, including appreciating the role of domestic politics.
	At the NAC ministerial on December 14, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles delivered a speech where he stated that, if the Europeans did not ratify the EDC, the US would be forced into an “agonizing reappraisal” of its policy toward Europe.  In a telegram only a month before, Ambassador to France Dillon urged Dulles to be careful about how the US position was presented.  He wrote, “I feel that it is not fully effective to picture EDC ratification as primarily a great crisis for France.  In particular, I worry about telling the French that if they do not ratify by some date, they will lose European leadership.  I also worry about telling them that non-ratification will force the United States to change its policy which has heretofore favored France….I am afraid that talk of this kind might…not have the hoped for effect.”  Later on, Dillon advises, “a straight presentation of the bad results for France could lead in many cases to resentment and stubbornness….I realize that this may sound like hair splitting, but in the super-charged emotional atmosphere that is beginning to build up here, I feel that even nuances of presentation can have determining importance.”​[96]​  Dulles and others exhibited growing frustration with French intransigence and decided to do exactly what Dillon had urged him not to do.  Consequently, the French assembly turned the EDC ratification as an attack on France rather than a threat to Western security.  Threats to France did not persuade the French to give in but only made them dig in their heels and resist greater.  
 
Lesson Three: Recognize the collateral effect of the rhetoric and positive effect of symbolic gestures.
	A similar and related lesson to be drawn is the impact of rhetoric on the overall relationship.  Dulles’ initial effort as Secretary of State was to project an image of a strong America prepared to defend itself and its allies against Soviet aggression by any means, including and especially nuclear weapons.  However, this strategy ironically had the unintended consequence of creating fear and anxiety among European allies regarding US intentions. 
	Differences between Americans and Europeans over the value of using nuclear weapons to deter all war (not just general) became clear and divisive.  In January 1954, the Eisenhower administration unveiled its new national security strategy.  This strategy promoted “more security at less cost,” which meant a greater reliance on deterrence (and nuclear weapons) than ever before.  Yet, to the Europeans, it looked like a withdrawal and provoked new anxieties.  According to one historian, “America’s nuclear weaponry, for all its sheer destructiveness, did not possess anything like the psychological and symbolic value of large manpower deployments.”​[97]​  Unlike today, it was the mass army that instilled fear and respect in the minds of the enemy and comfort and security for allies, not the atomic bomb.  The Administration’s “New Look” was scary to the Europeans, who feared that the Americans would remove the comfort of troops for the bulls-eye of nuclear weapons.  As Dulles acknowledged at an NSC meeting on 10 December 1953, “While we regarded atomic weapons as one of the great new sources of defensive strength, many of our allies regarded atomic capability as the gateway to annihilation.”​[98]​  
	The consequence of this situation was that American statements designed to encourage the Europeans had the boomerang effect of creating additional fear of US intentions and apathy about contributing to European defense among the very governments the US had sought to reassure.  As Dockrill notes, “[A]lthough Dulles and [SACEUR] Gruenther had hoped to strengthen European morale by emphasizing the importance of the contribution of American nuclear weapons to European security, this emphasis was, in fact, likely to have the opposite effect.”​[99]​
	Similarly, in the fight against terrorism, strong rhetorical statements may have the counter-productive effect of reducing support from allies.  Small gestures of consultation would go a long way in making clear the purpose and intent of US action.  Reintegrating the military tool with other national security policy instruments (diplomatic, informational, and economic) for maximum effect also is necessary.  

Lesson Four: Flexibility is a two-way street.
Some have argued that the US and Europe are tied together by democratic values and common history.​[100]​  Others note the important role that economics and investment play in the relationship.​[101]​  While these arguments are important, few have made the argument that the US and Europe are linked by a “security interdependence” – that is not tied to the Soviet threat.  By this, I mean the notion that the Americans and Europeans still need one another even after the end of the Cold War.  America cannot deny its European heritage.  Europe cannot deny its American debt.  The costs of going it alone are too high in patterns of repeated transactions.  The quality of the relationship is such that, defections may be necessary, but they are counterproductive in the long run.  The US and Europe need to work together to develop such flexible cooperation.
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